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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

USING PROPERTY TO TEACH STUDENTS HOW TO “THINK LIKE
A LAWYER:” WHETTING THEIR APPETITES AND APTITUDES

PETER T. WENDEL*
Like many law professors, particularly those who teach first-year courses, I
subscribe to the theory that it is not my job to teach students “Property,” it is
my job to teach them “to think like a lawyer.”1 So when I was invited to write
an article about “teaching Property,” I had to chuckle. In light of my teaching
philosophy, which disavows that teaching Property is my job, was I qualified?2
My concern was compounded when I considered my teaching style. I use the
Socratic approach. On the first day of each semester, I tell my students “it is
not my job to teach you, it is your job to teach me.”3 Who am I to write an
essay about teaching anything, much less Property?
Although the incongruity of the situation made me laugh at first, my
laughter soon turned to reflection.4 I began to construe the invitation to write
an essay about teaching Property in light of my teaching philosophy and style.
To the extent I claim to “teach students how to think like a lawyer,” could I
write an essay about how I use the law of property to achieve that goal? What
does it mean to “think like a lawyer?” How does one teach students to “think
like a lawyer?” I suddenly felt compelled to justify my whole existence.5
But if I’m unqualified to write an essay about “teaching Property,” I’m
even more unqualified to write about teaching students how to “think like a
lawyer.” Many learned law professors (more learned than me6) have
acknowledged that the primary purpose of law school is to teach students how
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A., 1979, University of Chicago;
M.A., 1980, Saint Louis University; J.D., 1983, University of Chicago. The Author thanks
Professor Jesse Dukeminier of the University of California, Los Angeles, and Professor Edward
Rabin of the University of California, Davis, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
submission. The Author also thanks Ms. Suzanne Baker, research assistant extraordinaire.
1. Sounds a hell of a lot more noble and meaningful, too.
2. My students have wondered the same for years.
3. As you can imagine, students just love it when you say that.
4. One of the classic criticisms of legal analysis is that it becomes a way of life. We can’t
limit it to legal issues. We tend to overanalyze everything, taking the fun out of everything.
Think about it. How often have you heard a law professor described as the life of a party? How
often have you heard a Property professor described as the life of a party?
5. Or at least my salary.
6. “Me”? “I”? See what I mean?
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to “think like a lawyer;7“ yet few have attempted to explain what it means or
how to go about it.8 It seems like defining what it means to “think like a
lawyer” is a bit like defining what constitutes pornography: we may not know
how to define it, but we know it when we see it.9 Where learned professors
fear to go, only a fool would rush in.
It would be neither the first time I was called a fool, nor, I dare say, the
last; but, nothing ventured, nothing gained. I attacked the challenge of
defining what it means to “think like a lawyer” with great effort and audacity.
I spent days engaged in the “sacred idleness” of professorial reflection. I
thought long and hard about what it means to “think like a lawyer.” Yet I kept
coming back to the same descriptions: “it means to think critically, to think
analytically, to think thoroughly.”10 Descriptions which admittedly are so
conclusory that they yield little insight into either what it means to “think like a
lawyer” or how one goes about teaching others how to do it.
I finally decided that the reason it is so difficult to define what it means to
“think like a lawyer” is that no one professor, and no one course, can achieve
the objective. Learning how to “think like a lawyer” is the cumulative effect of
three years of law school, of being exposed to different methods of teaching
and different methods of analysis. Since the process is larger than any one
professor, no one professor can define the process. Moreover, the process of
learning how to “think like a lawyer” is a “growing” process. Students “grow
analytically” with each class, just like children grow physically each day.
Such growth is so slow and incremental that it is near impossible to notice.
Just as we have a hard time noticing how much our children grow day to day,
7. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). Edwards, circuit judge for the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, stated that “the function of the first-year classes, rightly understood,
is to create in students the capacity to understand and use the full range of legal doctrines.” Id. at
58. Pierre Legrand, John Henry Merryman and Comparative Legal Studies: A Dialogue, 47 AM.
J. COMP. L. 3 (1999). Merryman, a professor of law at Stanford University, stated that “[o]ne of
the purposes of the first-year courses is to make our students think like lawyers.” Id. at 7.
Margaret M. Russell, Beginner’s Resolve: An Essay on Collaboration, Clinical Innovation, and
the First Year Core Curriculum, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 135, 140-41 (1994) (stating that a purpose
of “first year courses is to convey to students . . . a rigorous structure for ‘learning to think like a
lawyer’” and further stating that “what it means to ‘think like a lawyer’ is itself multifaceted and
subject to divergent interpretations”).
8. Marc Feldman & Jay M. Feinman, Legal Education: It’s Cause and Cure, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 914, 928 (1984) (stating that “[p]ractically nowhere in legal literature is there a definition of
‘thinking like a lawyer’”).
9. Paraphrasing Justice Stewart’s classic definition of obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring).
10. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and
Teachable in Legal Education, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 99-100 (2001) (suggesting that
thinking like a lawyer is “legal, analytic and analogical thinking” which is “a part, but not the
whole” of problem solving).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

USING PROPERTY TO TEACH STUDENTS HOW TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER”

735

so too law professors have a hard time noticing how much their students grow
analytically class to class. Paradoxically, the process of learning how to “think
like a lawyer” is both too large and too small for any one professor to describe.
There. I had rationalized my way out of defining what it means to “think
like a lawyer.”11 But my relief was short-lived.12 The conclusion that “the
process is larger than any one professor” still assumes that each professor and
each law school course contributes to the process. What contributions, if any,
do I and the law of property make? Moreover, even though we can’t “see” our
children grow on a day to day basis, we still encourage them to “eat well,” to
eat their vegetables. How do I encourage my students to “think well?” What
are the “vegetables” of the law of property?13
There are many different parts of the property course that provide “food
for thought” and that contribute to the process of teaching students how to
“think like a lawyer.” No doubt some academics would argue that forcing14
students to chew on the difficult theoretical question of “what is property?”15
helps them grow the most. Others would argue that forcing students to chew
on a whole host of difficult doctrinal questions contributes the most. “Is
“What is the Rule Against
adverse possession legalized theft?”16
Perpetuities?”17 “Do you have a property interest in your own body?”18 But
for me, the Property question which contributes the most to the process of
learning how to “think like a lawyer” is “who gets the fox?”19 That’s the
issue20 in Pierson v. Post,21 the first case I cover in my Property class. It is the

11. If that isn’t thinking like a lawyer, I don’t know what is!
12. See supra note 4.
13. No doubt my students would argue that I have the wrong food group. In light of all the
“lemons” in Property, “fruits” may be the more appropriate food group.
14. Inasmuch as we are talking about Property, and not Torts or Criminal Law—selections
for which most students have a natural appetite, I think “force-feeding” the students is the proper
description.
15. Is it a “bundle of rights” which attach to respective property interests, though not
necessarily the same bundle for all property interests? Or is it the allocation of rights between
and amongst different parties, thereby defining how different parties relate to each other with
respect to different property interests?
16. Is adverse possession the essence of communism or capitalism?
17. Many students have “gagged” on that doctrine.
18. Has cannibalistic overtones.
19. Though by the time I’m done with the case, students tend to think the issue looks more
like “road kill” than an appetizing part of the course.
20. Kind of; at least that’s what most students think the issue is at first. See infra text
accompanying note 34.
21. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The case of Pierson v. Post is discussed very early
on in many of the most well-known property casebooks. See, e.g., BARLOW BURKE ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW 1 (1999) (starting with Pierson v. Post on the first page of
the casebook); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 19 (1998) (including Pierson v.
Post as the second case discussed in the casebook); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL,
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perfect case for giving students a taste of what it means to “think like a
lawyer.”
To understand why Pierson v. Post is the perfect case for introducing
students to “thinking like a lawyer,” one has to put it in context. At most law
schools, Property is a first-year, first-semester course.22 The start of law
school is truly a dizzying experience. The study of law is such a multifaceted
endeavor, and so different from anything first-year law students have done
before, it can be overwhelming. We ask them to read a different type of text—
cases;23 we teach them using a different technique—the Socratic approach;24
and we test them differently—asking them to analyze fact patterns.25 As if

PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 94 (1998) (including Pierson v. Post as the third case discussed); J.
GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 4 (1998) (utilizing Pierson
v. Post as the first case in the casebook); GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY
32 (1996) (using Pierson v. Post as the first case discussed in the casebook).
22. Even where Property is a second-semester course, Pierson v. Post is still the perfect case
to start with because many students will still be struggling with what it means to “think like a
lawyer” and what it is they are supposed to be doing. In some respects, the case works better
when Property is a second-semester course because the students have spent a whole semester
banging their heads against a wall. They are looking for some help, whereas one could argue that
the first day of the first semester is too early to use Pierson v. Post because the students are not
open to its full significance.
23. We ask students to read cases, but we do not tell them why they are reading cases as
opposed to traditional educational texts, and we do not tell them how to read cases. Instead, we
recommend that they brief the case: what’s the procedural history, what are the “relevant” facts
(Relevant to what? How are they supposed to know when they’ve never briefed cases before?),
what’s the issue, what was the court’s analysis, what’s the rule of law, what was the holding?
And all that assumes that the students can figure out what the court is saying. The law has its
own language, a foreign language to the uninitiated. It is not uncommon for students to take up to
an hour to read just one page of a case. When first starting, to have any chance of understanding
the case, students need to have their legal dictionary at their sides as they read. Little wonder that
first-year law students are a bit confused when they come to class.
24. If students think reading cases is confusing, just wait until they come to class and are
introduced to the Socratic teaching method. In class, students are expected to be able to critique
each opinion they’ve read. From day one, without any prior legal training, students are asked to
sit in judgment of the opinion. (I tell my students that as law students they sit on the highest court
of the law, for we sit in judgment of every opinion written by any court.) Did the court get it
right? Is it a “good” opinion? Why? How are they supposed to know? How do you judge an
opinion? What makes an opinion a “good” opinion? What makes an opinion a “bad” opinion?
To make matters worse, the Socratic teaching style assumes that the best way to learn the answers
to these questions is for the professor to ask more questions. How are students supposed to learn
when all they get are questions? What are they supposed to be learning?
25. The typical law school exam presents law students with a fact pattern and asks them to
“analyze the issues presented.” What’s an issue? Is that a Property concept or a law school
concept—and who teaches it? Are these the same types of issues as in the cases they read? How
does one “spot” an issue? Were students taught that during the course? How are they supposed
to know? Even assuming they can spot an issue, what are they supposed to do with it? What
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these differences were not enough, within each difference are a whole host of
tasks that students must perform.26 We ask them to perform these tasks
without teaching these tasks or explaining how they are relevant to the larger
law school educational process. First-year law students find the start of law
school baffling. On top of that, the classroom discussion appears to pay scant
attention to what they assume they are supposed to be learning—the rules of
law. What the hell is going on, anyway? The course is entitled Property, isn’t
it?
Much of the reason the start of law school is such a dizzying experience is
that students come to law school with the mentality of Pavlov’s dog.27 As a
result of more than seventeen years of education,28 they have been conditioned
to think that the goal of the educational process is obtaining substantive
knowledge, and that the text and classroom components are merely means
towards that end. That end is tested by an exam, which asks them to
regurgitate the substantive knowledge they have learned during the course of
the class. Students begin law school salivating at the thought of reading books
setting forth the relevant rules, which they will memorize and regurgitate on
the exam. First-year law students are understandably confused, then, when
they are asked to read cases instead of texts, which set forth the relevant rules
of law. Why not just read hornbooks or student outlines? They are confused
when the professor continually asks questions instead of answering questions.
How can a running line of questions impart substantive knowledge? They are
confused when the test sets forth a fact pattern and asks them to analyze,
instead of asking them to regurgitate the rules they have learned.
The problem is first-year law students fail to appreciate that law school
turns the educational process on its head. What they assume are the “ends” of
the course, the rules of law, are merely the means used to teach them the
process of learning how to “think like a lawyer;” and what they think are the
means (the process), becomes the end.29 No one bothers to tell this to the
students though. Instead, they are simply “subjected to the process,”30 and it is
does it mean to “analyze” an issue? What does the professor want? How are the students
supposed to know since the professor never told them?
26. See supra notes 23-25.
27. Not that that justifies treating them like a dog. Hence, I prefer to use the “benevolent”
Socratic as opposed to the traditional “dog-kicking” Socratic approach.
28. Kindergarten, plus eight years of grade school, plus four years of high school, plus four
years of college, equals at least seventeen years of schooling before law school.
29. If that’s not dizzying enough in the abstract, try putting it into practice in the classroom
against a backdrop of seventeen years of conditioning that the opposite is true. The first couple of
weeks of law school is a challenging period for first-year professors as well, at least for those who
use the Socratic method.
30. Teaching students how to “think like a lawyer” by “subjecting them to the process” is
like teaching students how to swim by throwing them in the deep end of the pool and telling them
to swim. While some figure it out on their own, others drown.
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assumed that with time they will figure it out. This works for many students,
however, some become so battered and bruised in the learning process that
they become exasperated and quit trying. While there is no doubt that in the
end the process of “thinking like a lawyer” is a process, a skill, an art, which
can be learned only by trial and error, paying a bit more attention to the
process would facilitate the transition from thinking like a layperson to
thinking like a lawyer.31 From a Property perspective, Pierson v. Post is the
perfect place to “de-program” students and start the transition.
Pierson v. Post is a simple case, and its simplicity helps to make it the
perfect place to begin the process of teaching students how to “think like a
lawyer.” Its simplicity is deceiving in that there is so much more to the case
than meets the eye,32 and there are so many different ways the case can be used
to introduce the students to the concept of how to “think like a lawyer.”
To the extent learning how to “think like a lawyer” is a “growing” process,
I use Pierson v. Post to “measure” my students analytically—or I should say,
to let them measure themselves. Just as parents put pencil marks on door
frames to mark the growth of their children, I put the students’ initial analysis
of Pierson v. Post on the board to help them measure where they are in their
analytical development when they start law school. I start my treatment of
Pierson v. Post by asking for the facts, the issue, and the answer to the issue. I
write abbreviated versions of the students’ responses on the board:
FACTS:

Post, hunting w/ dogs, spies fox; in hot pursuit, closing in on
the kill when Pierson, seeing Post & knowing Post’s
intentions, shoots & kills fox33

ISSUE:

Who gets the fox?34

ANSWER: Pierson35

31. There was a time when many law schools had a course, which was specifically designed
to introduce law students to the legal analysis process. There has, however, been great change in
law school curriculums, especially in the first-year curriculum. As more and more was crammed
into the first year, the luxury of having a separate course on introducing students to legal analysis
proved to be too expensive. No doubt the assumption was that each first-year professor implicitly
covered the material in his or her own course. As the basic first-year courses were cut from six to
four or even three credits, however, professors felt more pressure to rush through the legal
methodology material to make sure they covered the core substantive material. The result has
been that at most law schools today there is no meaningful coverage of the topic of introducing
students to legal analysis.
32. Especially the eyes of a first-year law student.
33. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
34. Id. at 177.
35. Id. at 179-80.
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First-year law students tend to think about cases from a simplistic perspective
which focuses too much on the factual nature of the case. Unfortunately, this
tendency is reinforced by the classic case-briefing model that instructs students
to start by stating the facts of the case.36 Having started down that path,
students tend to stay on that path, stating the issue in a very fact-sensitive
manner. Having stated the issue in a fact-sensitive manner, they tend to state
the answer to the issue in a fact-sensitive manner. Hence the tendency to
“overfocus” on the factual nature of the case.37
After letting the students “brief” the case, I give them a chance to critique
the case, or at least their fact-sensitive version of the case. “Putting aside the
court’s holding, what should have been the outcome in the case, and why?”
Emboldened by their apparent success so far, students jump in eagerly. It
doesn’t take long for a debate to break out. Again, however, the students
interpret my question from their fact-sensitive perspective. I write abbreviated
versions of their answers on the board as fast as I can:
Post

Pierson

Post, because he put in all that
time hunting the fox.

Pierson, because he shot it.

Post, because it would be
unfair to let Pierson have it
after Post was the one who
made it run towards Pierson.

Pierson, because we don’t
know for sure if Post would
have ever caught the fox.

Post, because it was his business.

Pierson, because he got it
first.

Even the students’ analysis of the case, pro and con, focuses too much on the
particular facts of the case.
Having “measured” the students, and left their mark on the board, I try to
make them aware of the “growth” they will need to make to “think like a
lawyer.” I start the process by asking them to compare their comments to the
court’s opinion. “Whichever way you think the case should have come out,
36. See, e.g., JEFF DEAVER, THE COMPLETE LAW SCHOOL COMPANION 50 (1984)
(suggesting that “facts” should be the first element in a law student’s case brief following the case
name, court and date); GARY A. MUNNEKE, JR., HOW TO SUCCEED IN LAW SCHOOL 34 (1989).
37. But once the students learn how to read and analyze a case properly, it is important that
the students return to the facts of the case to determine which facts are the key facts, the
“outcome-determinative” facts. See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text, discussing the
“What if . . .” game and the interaction between the factual plane, the rule plane and the public
policy plane.
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why doesn’t the court’s opinion look more like our treatment of the case, our
comments on the board? Why is the court’s opinion so different from our
discussion of the case?” The questions make the students pause and think, and,
I hope, to begin to “measure” themselves. Most of the students recognize that
their initial analysis of the case, as expressed on the board, is definitely
different38 from the court’s treatment of the case, but they are not quite sure
how to articulate the differences; and they definitely are not prepared to
comment on the differences.
While the students are pondering the differences between their analysis of
the case and the court’s treatment, I try to help them by shifting gears and
asking: “What is a case? What is an opinion?” Ever since the adoption of the
Langdellian approach to the study of law,39 students are fed a steady diet of
cases during law school.40 Understanding what a case is, and what a judicial
opinion is, goes a long way towards facilitating what it means to “think like a

38. At this point it is probably premature to say that the students realize that their comments
and treatment don’t measure up to the court’s treatment, but in recognizing the differences and
coupling it with the natural deference first-year law students have for courts, one can’t help but
assume that at least some of the students have begun to measure themselves.
39. See, e.g., Clark Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1090
(1986) (describing the Langdellian approach as the assumption “that ‘law is rules’ and therefore
the function of legal education is to define and teach the rules”); Laurie A. Morin, Reflections on
Teaching Law as Right Livelihood: Cultivating Ethics, Professionalism, and Commitment to
Public Service From the Inside Out, 35 TULSA L.J. 227, 274 (2000) (stating that “the Langdellian
method emphasizes logic and reason over personal conviction”); Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend
It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 449, 449-53 (1996) (explaining that the Langdellian approach refers to “Christopher
Columbus Langdell’s proposal that law be taught as a process of thinking as well as a doctrine of
thought,” and through case law “as a science rather than a craft”).
The Langdellian Approach, however, has been highly criticized. See, e.g., Derrick Bell
& Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2025, 2046
(1993) (stating that Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Harry T. Edwards, “rejects Langdellian formalism and does not believe the
case method is an effective method of teaching”); Bob Gordon, Jack Schlegal, James May & Joan
Williams, Legal Education Then and Now: Changing Patterns in Legal Training and in the
Relationship of Law Schools to the World Around Them, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 768 (1998)
(casebook author Joan Williams rejects the Langdellian model); Pierre Schlag, Law and
Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 902 (1997) (stating that “[t]he very fact that virtually all
American legal thinkers explicitly ‘reject’ or ‘renounce’ Langdellianism is usually understood in
the American legal academy to spell the demise of the Langdellian paradigm”).
40. Cases are what students are asked to read before they come to class; cases are what
students are asked to analyze during class; the fact pattern for a new case is what students are
given on the exam; students are asked to analyze and write a well-written opinion. The principal
tool used to teach students how to think like a lawyer, and to evaluate how well they think like a
lawyer, is the case.
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lawyer.”41 Nothing in the traditional Property casebook prepares the students
for this question, and I assign no supplemental reading for it. The purpose of
the question and ensuing discussion is merely to convey a sense of the judicial
process.42
To help guide the discussion, and to help the students visualize the process,
I suggest that we “diagram” the evolution of a typical case. I draw a timeline
on the board. We start, naturally, at the beginning. “How does a case begin?
How did the case of Pierson v. Post begin?” Someone recites the facts of the
case again.43 I put an “X” on the timeline and write above it “dispute arises.” I
assign two students to play the roles of the respective parties. Verbally, we reenact what might have happened that day—what the parties probably said to
each other.44 I ask the students to pay close attention to the arguments the
parties made to each other—to pay close attention not just to the substance of
the arguments, but to the nature of the comments.45
“How does that factual dispute become a case?” The students have no
problem with that step. I put another “X” on the timeline, just to the right of
the initial mark, and write “Plaintiff (Post) consults an attorney.” I assign a
new student to play the role of Post’s attorney. “What’s the role of the
attorney? What does the attorney do? What does the attorney contribute to the
evolution of the case?” We muddle our way through the role of the attorney:
investigate the facts, research the law, and advise the client. I try to focus the
discussion on what it means to say the attorney “researches the law.” “Why
does the attorney research the law?” “What is the lawyer looking for?”
Intuitively the students know the answer: a legal doctrine or rule of law which
supports the party’s position.46 I introduce the concept of a “cause of
action”—a legal doctrine that, if established, entitles the party to relief.47
“What cause of action did Post’s attorney rely upon?” Almost immediately
one can hear the sound of pages being flipped as the students scan the opinion
41. I do not mean to imply that “thinking like a lawyer” applies only to case law as opposed
to statutory law.
42. I assure the students that they will learn the details of the process in their other courses,
Civil Procedure in particular.
43. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
44. Profanity and all.
45. The students don’t really understand what I mean by the “nature” of the comments, but
my hope is that my intent will become clear with time. The Socratic teaching approach often
intentionally creates confusion, for confusion forces the students to exercise their minds.
Thinking like a lawyer is an active process that requires an active mind, one which is “in shape”
and which enjoys exercising: thinking.
46. We note the different types of law and the different places where a lawyer may find a
legal doctrine or rule of law which supports the client’s claim: the constitution, statutory law, case
law, administrative law, local ordinances, et cetera.
47. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.11, at 156-57 (4th ed. 1992) (defining
a “cause of action” as “a group of facts that give rise to one or more rights of relief”).
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for help. The students begin to realize that maybe they haven’t read the
opinion quite as carefully as they thought. Finally someone finds it: trespass
on the case.48 “What’s trespass on the case?” After an awkward moment of
silence, one can hear the sound of backpacks being unzipped as the students
reach for their Black’s Law Dictionary. Our discussion has slowed noticeably.
I assure the students we are not going to sweat the details of the evolution of a
case, or the particular cause of action in any given case, but that they need to
see how the cause of action relates to the rest of the case. The cause of action
is one of the basic ingredients that contribute to the flavor of the case. We
arrive at a working definition for trespass on the case—unlawfully interfering
with the property of another.49 To see if the students understand how the cause
of action relates to the case, I ask what is Post’s argument that he is entitled to
relief under trespass on the case. The students surmise quickly that Post is
claiming that by killing the fox, Pierson unlawfully interfered with Post’s
property—the fox.50
Returning to the evolution of a case, we move on quickly. We discuss
briefly how the plaintiff’s attorney then drafts a document, called a complaint
or declaration, which sets forth the facts, the plaintiff’s cause of action, and the
relief the plaintiff is seeking; how the attorney files it with the court51 and
serves it upon the opposing party, the defendant; and how the defendant then
goes to his or her attorney and develops a response or answer to the complaint
which is filed with the court52 and served on the plaintiff.53 I call on another
student to play the role of Pierson’s attorney. “What is Pierson’s answer to
Post’s complaint?” The student quickly realizes the answer: “Pierson did not
unlawfully interfere with Post’s property because Post never acquired a
property interest in the fox.” I introduce briefly the concept of a demurrer.54

48. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
49. I utilize a working definition, rather than the dictionary definition, of trespass on the case
so that the students can fully grasp it. However, in actuality, this definition refers to the modern
day cause of action for trespass to chattels. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1509 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining trespass to chattels as “[t]he act of committing, without lawful justification, any act of
direct physical interference with a chattel possessed by another”).
50. Although one could also make the argument that the property interest Post was claiming
was in his right to hunt, his labor, that is beyond most, if not all, of the students on the first day.
Most students don’t see that argument until after we cover Keeble v. Hickeringill. See infra notes
82-86 and accompanying text.
51. Another mark on the timeline in the evolution of a case—filing the complaint.
52. Another mark on the timeline in the evolution of a case—filing the answer.
53. See generally DELMAR KARLEN, CIVIL LITIGATION 11-40 (1978) (discussing complaints
and answers).
54. Even if the plaintiff can prove all the facts alleged, the plaintiff is still not entitled to
relief as a matter of law. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a demurrer as
“[a] pleading stating that although the facts alleged in a complaint may be true, they are
insufficient for the plaintiff to state a claim for relief and for the defendant to frame an answer”).
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“In light of Post’s cause of action and Pierson’s answer, what’s the issue in the
case?” The students have little trouble stating the issue: How does one acquire
a property interest in a fox? I write the new statement of the issue on the board
next to the old one:55
ISSUE: Who gets the fox?

How does one acquire a property interest in
a fox?

My hope is that by juxtaposing the students’ initial statement of the issue with
their revised statement of the issue, the students will begin to appreciate the
differences—to notice how fact-sensitive the one is and how generic and legal
the other is; my hope is that the students will “measure” themselves and note
the growth in their analysis.
Returning to the timeline, we cover the remaining ground quickly. We talk
briefly about discovery, motions,56 the possibility of settlement discussions and
alternative dispute resolution options, and the major steps in a trial:57 jury
selection, opening statements, plaintiff presents his or her case, defendant
presents his or her case, closing arguments, verdict/judgment.58 We talk about
the purpose of a trial: to determine the facts and apply the law to see who
should prevail. We discuss how typically the jury determines the facts,59 and
then how the court instructs the jury on the law to be applied to the facts.60 We
complete the timeline diagram of the evolution of a typical case by briefly
discussing the appellate process: the different levels of courts of appeals,61 the
general principle that courts of appeal accept the facts as determined at trial
and can only consider questions of law,62 alleged mistakes of laws. As a

55. See supra note 34 and accompanying text discussing how the students came up with the
original issue statement “Who gets the fox?”.
56. Assuring the students that these topics will be covered in other classes, most notably
Civil Procedure.
57. Another mark on the timeline.
58. Again assuring the students that these topics will be covered in other classes, most
notably Evidence and Trial Practice.
59. ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSTENG, ADVOCACY, PLANNING TO WIN: EFFECTIVE
PREPARATION § 2.13 (1994) (stating that “[i]n a jury trial, the jury is the fact finder”).
60. Id. (stating that, in a jury trial, the judge “instructs the jury regarding the law” and “[t]he
jurors apply the law given by the judge to the facts”).
61. The general rule is that each party is entitled to an automatic right to appeal to the
intermediate court of appeals, with a right to petition for further appellate consideration, if need
be, from the highest court of appeal. See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 47, §§
12.7-12.9, at 659-74.
62. Id. § 12.9, at 668 (stating that “an appellate court reviews questions of law and may not
substitute its own view of the facts or make new fact findings”).
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general rule, parties cannot appeal questions of fact, only questions of law.63
The issue on appeal must be an issue of law.
With this better understanding of what a case is, and how a case evolves,
the students should have a better sense of how they should read and analyze an
opinion. Enriched by this background, we return to Pierson v. Post. I ask the
students if the opinion is a trial court opinion or a court of appeals opinion.64
They quickly realize it is a court of appeals opinion.65 I sense the students are
starting to think about the opinion from a different perspective as they view the
case from the perspective of the timeline. They begin to see the questions
coming, to ask them themselves. “Who prevailed at the trial court level?”
Post.66 “What mistake of law does Pierson allege was made at the trial court
level? What’s the issue on appeal?” Without fail an eager student blurts out:
“How does one acquire a property interest in a fox?” Most of the students nod
their heads in agreement. “Does everyone agree?” Someone finally offers that
the court expressly said that the parties were in agreement that to acquire a
property interest in a wild animal, there must be occupancy.67 That answer,
however, merely begs the question: what constitutes occupancy? After some
hesitation, the students agree that this is the issue on appeal.
I go back to the board and write the new version of the issue statement next
to the other two issue statements, implicitly asking the students to “measure”
themselves, their reading of the case, their analysis of the case, yet again. By
juxtaposing their different answers to the question “what is the issue in the
case?” my hope is that they will see how we have moved from their initial
statement of the issue, a purely factual statement of the issue,68 to a purely
legal statement of the issue:69
ISSUE: Who gets the fox?

How does one acquire a
property interest in a fox?

What constitutes
occupancy?

Implicit in the comparison of the issue statements is the question of which
version is better. But I hold off on that question, for now.

63. Id. § 12.9, at 669 (stating that “[w]hether the fact issues in the trial court are determined
by a jury or a judge, the appellate court limits itself to inquiring whether they rest on a substantial
evidentiary basis”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (stating that “[f]indings of fact, whether based
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses”).
64. While that may sound like a “duh” question to anyone reading this, one has to remember
how little a first-year, first-day law student knows.
65. Another mark on the timeline of the evolution of a case—the appeal.
66. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
67. Id. at 177.
68. One might say a layperson’s statement of the issue.
69. One might say a more “lawyerly” statement of the issue.
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Having stated the issue on appeal, the students expect me to jump into the
court’s analysis of the issue. But presentation is everything. The table has not
yet been properly set. Before analyzing the court’s treatment of the issue, the
students need to appreciate the significance of the discussion. “What is
occupancy?” “Conceptually, how would you classify the statement ‘what
constitutes occupancy?’” Sometimes the Socratic approach is painful,
particularly when asking such abstract questions. But sooner or later I usually
find a student who is either a good mind-reader or who is on the same
wavelength as I. “Occupancy is a rule of law.” Therefore, the issue “what
constitutes occupancy” must be a question of law. But recognizing that
occupancy constitutes a rule of law is just the appetizer. The entree is “how
does the court describe the issue.” Again the students have to scan the opinion
for the answer, not having appreciated the significance of the language in the
opinion upon their initial reading of the case. The court calls it a “novel”
issue.70 “What’s the significance of the court’s description?” This point takes
some time, but it is critical that the students understand what the court is
saying, and hence “doing.” It takes some time for the students to comprehend
and articulate the point fully. By deciding a “new” or “novel” question, or a
“question of first impression,” the court is making law.
Many law students come to law school with the notion that a court’s job is
merely to apply existing law to the facts. Their high school civics classes
taught them that legislatures make the law and courts apply the law. That is
the layperson’s understanding of legislatures and courts. The common law
tradition that courts can make law is new to many students. We talk about the
implications of saying that the court is making new law: “How should the court
go about it? What should the court consider, and why? What will be the scope
of the court’s opinion? Who will be affected by the court’s opinion?”
The students begin to see the case on two levels. There is “the case,” the
unresolved factual dispute between the parties that needs to be resolved; and
there is “the issue,” a novel question of law that needs to be resolved. In
resolving the latter, the court is making law. When making law, the court
needs to consider what is in the best interests of society, and why; the court
needs to consider how similarly situated parties will be affected, not just the
parties before the court. The students’ discussion picks up pace again. One
can sense the level of interest and excitement picking up as the students get
their first taste of what it means to “think like a lawyer.”
Having altered the students’ state of mind, it helps to have them apply it to
an actual case instead of simply continuing at the abstract level. Pierson v.
Post is served up yet again. “How did the court answer the issue on appeal?
What rule of law did the court adopt for ‘what constitutes occupancy,’ and
why? What rule of law did the dissent argue should have been adopted, and
70. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 177.
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why?” These are more challenging questions than “what are the facts.”
Discerning what constitutes the rule of law to take away from the opinion, and
why the court adopted that statement of the rule, is more of an “art” than a
science. We spend a considerable amount of time attempting to identify the
court’s statement of what constitutes occupancy. It is easier to find the
dissent’s proposed rule of law: hot pursuit with reasonable prospect of
capture.71 It takes longer for the students to agree on what constitutes the
majority’s statement of its rule of law: one must manifest an unequivocal intent
to appropriate the animal to one’s individual use, deprive the animal of its
natural liberty, and bring the animal within certain control.72 We talk about
how sometimes lawyers, and even courts, will disagree over the rule of law
adopted by the court, and how that question will serve as an issue in later
cases.
“Why did the court adopt the rule it did? Why did the dissent think that a
different version of the rule should have been adopted?” As before, I write the
students’ answers on the board:
Majority/Court
minimize disputes
promote peace
efficiency/minimize costs of
administration

Dissent
custom of hunters
maximize the kill of foxes
fairness

I like to write these comments next to the students’ earlier comments about
who should have won, and why.73 I ask the students how they would
“categorize” these considerations. “Are these factual considerations, legal
considerations, or something else? If something else, how would they describe
these considerations?” Again, it takes awhile for a student to see where I’m
going, but sooner or later someone recognizes that these are public policy and
theoretical considerations.
I ask the students to compare the “temporal direction” of these
considerations as opposed to their initial thoughts about how the case should
have come out and why.74 As with many, if not most of my more abstract
questions, the students are confused initially by the phrase “temporal
direction.” I go to the timeline. Putting my finger on the “X” indicating the

71. Id. at 182 (proposing that “property in animals ferae naturae may be acquired without
bodily touch or manucaption, provided the pursuer be within reach, or have a reasonable
prospect . . . of taking, what he has thus discovered an intention of converting to his own use”).
72. Id. at 178.
73. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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time of the appeal, I ask which direction the court is looking when it focuses
on these considerations—prospectively at the future implications of its ruling,
or retrospectively, at the facts of this particular case? The students
immediately recognize that the temporal direction of the court’s analysis is
prospective.
In making its rule of law, the court’s focus is on the future implications of
its ruling, not this particular case.75 Since the court is making law, the court’s
focus is on what is in society’s best interests and how similarly situated parties
will be affected, not just the parties before the court. The students recognize
that their initial analysis of the case was completely retrospective, focusing
almost completely on the facts of this particular case and not on the larger
issue. They did not appreciate the multiple levels of the opinion: the factual,
the legal, and the theoretical/public policy. To the extent the court’s opinion is
an example of “thinking like a lawyer,” the students have been forced to
“measure” themselves, their analytical abilities, with those of the court.
Realizing that students are often dazed and confused by the start of law
school, I pause at this point to let the students digest what they have been
chewing on. I try to make the students more conscious of the process they
have just experienced—of the interaction between the factual, legal, and
theoretical/public policy considerations that is inherent in the process of
“thinking like a lawyer.” “How did the case start?” As a factual dispute. I do
my best to draw a three-dimensional plane. I label it the factual plane. I put an
“X” in the middle of the plane, representing the factual dispute. “Where did
we go in our initial attempts to resolve the dispute?” The lawyers went
looking for a legal doctrine or rule of law that would resolve the dispute. I do
my best to draw a three-dimensional plane floating above the factual plane. I
label this the rule plane. “To the extent there was no rule of law on the rule
plane which resolved the dispute, or there was a rule but it was ambiguous,
where did we go?” The court went looking for the relevant public policy and
theoretical considerations to help it determine what the law should be. I do my
best to draw another three-dimensional plane, this one floating above the rule
plane. I label it the public policy plane.
“What’s the relationship between and among the planes?” The relevant
public policy and theoretical considerations determine the rules of law the
courts adopt. Inasmuch as the court is creating new law, law which will apply
not only to the case before the court, but to all similarly situated parties in the
future, the rule is stated generically and more broadly than would be necessary

75. I often support this point by asking the students to categorize the paragraphs of the
opinion. In particular, once the court states the issue, I ask how many paragraphs go by before
the court mentions the parties in any meaningful way. What is the court doing in those
paragraphs in between? Considering what should be the rule of law, and why, without
mentioning the particulars of the case before it.
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if the court were merely resolving the case before it. The wording of the rule
establishes its scope. The “scope of the rule” casts a corresponding shadow on
the factual plane. The new rule of law controls and resolves all disputes on the
factual plane that come within the scope of the shadow cast by the scope of the
rule of law. Disputes that arise smack dab in the middle of the scope of the
rule are fairly simple cases. They merely involve applying the elements of the
rule to the facts. Disputes that arise near the edge of the shadow cast by the
scope of the rule fall into the “grey area.” As the factual disputes get closer to
the edge, it is unclear whether the dispute comes within the scope of the rule
and should be controlled by it or not. To the extent the court is called upon to
clarify the scope of the rule, the court, in essence, is making new law by
clarifying the limits of an existing rule. In clarifying the scope of the rule, the
court must resort to the rationale for the rule. Thus, the court must resort to the
public policy and theoretical underpinnings of the rule.
One could argue that is exactly what the court was doing in Pierson v.
Post. There was an existing rule of law that both parties agreed controlled the
case. To acquire a property interest in the fox there must be occupancy. As
applied to the particular facts in Pierson v. Post, however, there was
disagreement over what constituted “occupancy.” Was “hot pursuit” enough
or must there be more? In clarifying the scope of the existing rule, the court
was creating new law. In creating new law, the court was driven by the
relevant public policy and theoretical considerations.
Students must properly understand what the court did and why before they
are in a position to critique what the court did and why. Now that the students
know how to read an opinion, they are in a position to critique it. Pierson v.
Post is a great case for introducing the students to the process of critiquing a
court’s opinion because the case has a dissenting opinion which serves nicely
as both an example of how to critique an opinion and as a spring board for
bringing in additional points and considerations.
Having identified the rule of law adopted by the court and its rationale, and
the rule of law proposed by the dissent and its rationale, it is easy to start the
critique of Pierson v. Post: “who got it right and why, the majority or the
dissent?” In many respects, the ensuing debate resembles the initial debate
over who should have prevailed and why,76 only this time the debate is
focusing on the relationship between the rule plane and the public
policy/theoretical plane, between the rule statement and the public policy and
theoretical considerations.77 In particular, the debate concerns the latter. “To

76. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
77. Questions concerning the court’s definition of occupancy and why it adopted the rule it
did require the students to see the interaction between the rule plane and the public policy/theory
plane. To the extent the latter controls the former, it is important for the students to be
comfortable with the relationship between the planes for that is the essence of the process of
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the extent multiple public policies were identified by the court and the dissent,
which one, or ones, should control and why? What are the assumptions
underlying the respective policy considerations and arguments? Are there
other considerations which should have been raised but were not?”
The students begin to see the different faces of an opinion. One can agree
with the result (the outcome between the parties), but disagree with the rule
adopted by the court. One can agree with the outcome and the rule, but
disagree with the rationale for the rule. One can agree with the rule but
disagree with the outcome (argue the court misapplied the rule). There are so
many different ways to dissect an opinion.
Having dissected and critiqued the opinion, the students need to know how
to apply it. The easiest and arguably best place to begin is with the case
itself.78 “In light of the rule of occupancy adopted by the court, why did Post
lose?” The question is designed to force the students to think about the
relationship between the rule plane and the factual plane. How does one apply
a rule to a particular fact pattern? Intuitively most of the students realize you
should start with the rule. Intuitively most of them realize that you can break
most rules down into segments or elements. The court’s statement of
occupancy has three obvious elements. To help the students, I write the rule
statement, as broken into its elements by the students, on the board next to the
students’ statement of the facts:
OCCUPANCY
(1) unequivocal intent to
appropriate to one’s
individual use
(2) deprive of natural liberty
(3) brought within certain control

FACTS
Post, hunting w/ dogs, spies
fox; in hot pursuit, closing in
on the kill when Pierson,
seeing Post & knowing Post’s
intentions, shoots & kills fox

The students tend to see the relationship between the rule and factual planes
more easily and quickly than they see the relationship between the rule plane
and the public policy/theoretical plane.
In applying the elements to the facts, I suggest to the students that they
start with the elements that they think are most easily satisfied and work their
way to the elements or parts of the rule in dispute. In articulating their
analysis, I suggest that they lead with the rule or element being analyzed and

making law. When challenging the wisdom of a particular law, or one or more of its elements,
invariably the focus of the analysis will occur between these two planes (with reference to factual
scenarios merely as evidence of the consequences of the rule).
78. Though a statistically disproportionate percentage of cases in casebooks are creation
cases. That makes sense, though, from an academic perspective.
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then bring in the facts. With respect to the first element, the students have no
trouble. Post established his unequivocal intent to appropriate the fox by
hunting and pursuing the fox. As for the second and third elements, the
students argue that Post did not deprive the animal of its natural liberty or
bring it within certain control because he did not capture the fox. Students
tend to bunch the “deprived the animal of its natural liberty and brought within
certain control” elements into one requirement—that the party actually possess
or capture the animal.79
I try to discourage such thinking by asking, “If you were Post, would you
concede both elements, or is there an argument you can make in good faith at
least as to one of them?” At this point, some creative student raises his or her
hand and argues that Post had deprived the fox of its natural liberty because by
chasing the fox, the fox was no longer free to roam the woods as it wished; its
movements were in large part dictated by the hot pursuit of the hounds and
dogs. Suddenly those students who thought the element was open and shut
have their eyes opened. I encourage my students to be aggressive, to be
creative, to raise all arguments which could be raised in good faith, even
“losing” arguments. Effective advocacy puts the burden on the other party to
rebut the losing argument. The issue of whether or not Post has deprived the
fox of its natural liberty, however, arguably is made moot by the last
requirement. All the students agree with the court that Post’s mere hot pursuit
did not bring the animal within certain control. Whether or not the students
agree with the rule statement the court adopted for occupancy, the students
agree that the court applied the rule to these facts correctly.
But that is too easy. Having created the factual plane/rule plane/theoretical
plane analytical template, it is time to let the students try it out. To the extent
students are fed a steady diet of cases during law school, students need to
realize that it is good to “play with your food.” In particular, I introduce the
students to the “What if . . .” game.
“What if we had the same facts as Pierson v. Post, only this time, as Post
was closing in on the fox, the fox collapsed, exhausted from all the running.
As Post is getting off his horse to come over and grab the fox, Pierson walks
up and grabs it first. Who gets the fox and why? Same case or different?”
Most of the students argue that this is a different case. All agree that the first
element is the same. Post has established his unequivocal intent to appropriate
the animal by hunting and pursuing it. Most of the students think that Post
deprived the animal of its natural liberty since the fox was lying on the ground,
lifeless. The issue is whether the animal has been brought under certain
control since it was lying on the ground, lifeless, but not restrained or dead.
79. I try to point out to them that while there is great overlap between the two elements, they
are not necessarily the same, and that as a general rule students should be wary of combining
elements of a rule that the court deemed necessary to set forth separately.
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Some argue that inasmuch as Pierson was able to walk over and pick the fox
up, it was brought under certain control the moment it collapsed. Others argue
that until the fox is in someone’s hands, at any moment it may regain its
strength, spring to its feet, and be off again. Thus, Post did not bring it under
certain control. “In light of the reasonable and good faith arguments which can
be brought on behalf of both parties, how do we resolve the issue? What is the
issue?” Most of the students realize that the issue in this hypo is what
constitutes “certain control.” In resolving the issue, we need to consider the
relevant public policy and theoretical considerations. The students begin to
understand that this is how the common law evolved. One case leading to
another case, which leads to another, and so on. The process continues to this
day, in all areas of the law.
“What if we had the same facts as Pierson v. Post, only the parties were
named Wendel and Smith, and Wendel was the one hunting with dogs. Same
analysis and result as before, or different?” The students all say same result.
“Why? Can’t I distinguish my case by saying that the parties are different?”
Yes, but that distinction makes no difference to our analysis. Similarly
situated parties should be treated the same. That is one of the basic principles
of a legal system based on rules of law.
“What if we had the same facts as Pierson v. Post, only the events occurred
on Post’s property? Same result or different?” The students all say different
result. Post should prevail. “Why? Why is this case different from Pierson v.
Post when my earlier hypo wasn’t?” Pierson is on Post’s property. “So, what
difference does that make?” Pierson is trespassing. “So?” We want to
discourage trespassing, they say. I ask the students to notice how their
arguments play out on the three plane analytical template. In determining
whether a factual distinction makes a difference, the students intuitively go to
the public policy plane to see if the factual distinction raises a new public
policy and/or theoretical consideration. Changing the names of the parties
raises no new public policy considerations, so the case is indistinguishable
from the original case of Pierson v. Post. The result is the same, as it should
be. On the other hand, having the events occur on Post’s property raises a new
public policy consideration: deterring trespass.
That public policy
consideration trumps the public policy considerations driving the rule of
occupancy (maximizing the kill of foxes, efficiency, minimizing disputes),80 so
we create a different rule to control that factual scenario: the doctrine of

80. Though this last consideration supports both rules.
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ratione soli.81 That rule promotes the controlling public policy consideration
and socially desirable outcome of deterring trespass.82
“What if Post was hunting ducks instead of foxes, and he had built a duck
pond on his property which he used to attract ducks so he could catch them,
take them to market, and sell them. Pierson lives next door. One day, Pierson
goes to the edge of his property and shoots his gun off over his own property,
thereby scaring away the ducks in the air. No ducks were in the pond when
Pierson shot off the gun. Post sues. Who wins, and why?” Most of, if not all,
the students say Pierson. Although Post may have established his unequivocal
intent to appropriate the ducks to his individual use by building the duck pond,
there is no evidence he deprived them of their natural liberty or brought them
within his certain control. “But this hypo is basically the fact pattern in Keeble
v. Hickeringill,83 and there the court held that Keeble, the one who built the
pond, was entitled to recover from Hickeringill for shooting off the gun.84 Are
the cases reconcilable, or irreconcilable?” I like to end class with that
question. I assign Keeble v. Hickeringill for the next class, hoping that the
hypo has whetted their appetites. Can they explain the apparent conflict
between the holdings, or can they identify which opinion is wrong and why?
It is, admittedly, a tough set of cases to chew on so early in their
development, but invariably some of the better students see, and articulate, that
the cases are different. In Pierson v. Post, both parties were trying to kill the
fox, the socially desirable goal. In Keeble v. Hickeringill, while Keeble was
trying to capture the duck to bring it to market, the socially desirable goal,
Hickeringill was simply trying to scare the ducks away to prevent Keeble from
getting them. Hickeringill was not trying to advance the socially desirable goal
of increasing the supply of goods for consumers. The court’s opinion in
Keeble v. Hickeringill discusses implicitly the difference between productive
competition (that which advances the socially desirable good) and destructive
competition (that which merely hinders another without advancing the socially
desirable good).85 In light of the factual distinction,86 which raised new public
81. An owner of real property has constructive possession of all wild animals on his or her
property. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 21, at 33 n. 2.
82. I also use this hypo to discuss what constitutes a “relevant” fact. During the discussion, I
ask the students why “deterring trespass” was not a relevant consideration in Pierson v. Post.
Someone answers “because the hunt and confrontation occurred on ‘unowned wasteland.’” “Is
that a relevant fact?” In light of this new hypo and rule of law (ratione soli), all the students say
“yes.” “Should that fact have been included in our initial statement of the facts in the case?” See
supra text accompanying note 33. All of the students now agree it should be. “Why?” Because
it is what we call an “outcome-determinative fact”—if you change the fact, the outcome in the
case changes. If a fact is an outcome-determinative fact, it should be included in the factual
statement for the case.
83. 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1707).
84. Id. at 1129.
85. Id. at 1128.
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policy considerations,87 the court created a new rule, malicious interference
with trade, which promotes the relevant public policy considerations and
insures that the socially desirable goal is promoted in this factual situation.88
By the end of Pierson v. Post and the other wild animal material, the
students have been exposed to the basic legal analysis skills and techniques
they will need to “think like a lawyer.”89 By then, they realize they need to be
more conscious of the relationship between the factual, legal, and theoretical
considerations at stake in each case. They need to see how the planes relate to
one another. They need to see how “application cases” primarily involve the
factual and legal planes; “creation cases” involve primarily the public policy
plane and the legal plane; and “distinguishing cases” primarily involve the
factual plane and the public policy plane.90 More importantly, they need to
become proficient at transitioning from one plane to another as the case and
arguments dictate,91 and at using the interaction between the planes to further
their analysis.92

86. Keeble was not trying to promote the socially desirable outcome, killing the animal,
while Pierson was.
87. The new considerations are promoting and protecting socially productive competition
while deterring socially destructive competition.
88. Notice the interaction between the different analytical planes in this sentence alone. The
dispute, which arose on the factual plane, introduced a new policy consideration, the public
policy/theoretical plane, which gave rise to a new rule of law, the rule plane, which was then
applied to the facts of the case, the factual plane, to promote the desired socially productive
behavior.
89. I end up spending about four one-hour classes covering Pierson v. Post, Keeble v.
Hickeringill, and the related wild animal materials. I find that the students tend to not tire of the
material though, because they hunger for guidance on legal analysis.
90. Some learning theories claim that people in general tend to learn in one of two ways.
Some people focus on the big picture (the public policy/theoretical considerations) and have a
more difficult time filling in the details (the rules and corresponding factual components). Other
people focus on the details (the factual considerations and rules) and have a harder time with the
big picture (the public policy and theoretical considerations). Interestingly, studies have shown
that law students who tend to do well are those who are “ambidextrous”—they tend to be good at
both the big picture and the details. Such findings are consistent with the notion that effective
lawyers need to be adept at moving swiftly and smoothly between and among the different
analytical planes inherent in “thinking like a lawyer.”
91. The three plane analytical template is intended to help the students learn how to “think
like a lawyer.” It is merely a suggestion about how they might start out visualizing the process.
As the template evidences, one of the reasons it is so hard to describe what it means to “think like
a lawyer” is that there is no one analytical process. Depending on the scenario, the different
planes interact differently. One needs to develop a comfort level with the different planes, and to
be aware of the interaction between and among the different planes, to know how to use them in
any given case. Moreover, “thinking like a lawyer” means that the three analytical planes need to
be examined from all possible perspectives. One way of thinking about it is that the three
analytical planes are cut from fine crystal and they are encased in a crystal ball. For each issue in
each case, the lawyer’s job is to hold the “crystal ball” up to the light and to turn and twist it
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I have heard a number of students and professors say that the way law
professors teach students how to “think like a lawyer” is like teaching students
how to swim by throwing the students into the deep end of a pool. I prefer to
think that teaching law students how to “think like a lawyer” is like teaching
children how to ride a bike. First and foremost, “thinking like a lawyer” is a
process, an activity, which one can learn and master only by doing—like riding
a bike. No matter how much or how well one describes the process, in the end,
one learns it only by trial and error—like riding a bike. Some will master the
process quickly, as if they were “naturals,” while others will struggle for quite
some time—like riding a bike. No doubt many would argue that the
“swimming” analogy is better because students feel so overwhelmed by the
process it is like they are drowning at first.
I prefer the “riding the bike” analogy. Just like riding a bike, students
stumble and fall off at first, skinning their egos and embarrassing themselves.
But with each ride,93 they improve, they go a bit further, wobbly as it may be,
until one day, it clicks. Suddenly, they master the “balance” between the
factual, legal and theoretical/public policy planes that is necessary to master
“thinking like a lawyer.” Once the students master the basics of balancing the
different planes within the analytical template, then they can move on to the
more creative uses of the process—”riding with no hands” and “popping
wheelies.” But such challenging and advanced analytical skills are best left to
the more exciting upper level courses—like Wills & Trusts.

slowly, to discern all the different colors created as the light refracts as it passes through the
different planes, to discern all the different ways in which one could view the issue.
92. Invariably, after a couple of months of law school, a first-year Property student will stop
me in the hall and proudly tell me that they think they are beginning to “think like a lawyer”
because they can answer most of my questions now. I congratulate them on their “growth.” But I
tell them the “measure” of whether they are “thinking like a lawyer” is not whether they can
answer my questions, but whether they can ask them before I do.
93. As professors, we can simply give them a push and stand back and watch as they fall, or
we can run alongside them for awhile, helping them get a sense of the process, before letting go
to see if they can do it on their own.

